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Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: 
The Unintended “Great Mischief for Indian 
Energy Development” and the Resulting Need 
for Reform 
ELIZABETH ANN KRONK* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, escaping stories of political acrimony seems 
impossible.  Despite this intense atmosphere, the majority of 
Americans seem to agree that finding new sources of energy is a 
national priority.1  These same citizens also believe that the 
United States is failing to adequately develop its domestic energy 
resources.2  President Obama has made statements on numerous 
occasions indicating his strong support for the development of 
new energy sources, especially alternative energies.3  The GOP 
 
*Assistant Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law.  J.D., University 
of Michigan School of Law; B.S., Cornell University.  This article is dedicated to 
Professor David Getches, who walked on from this world on July 5, 2011.  Thank 
you for teaching me, inspiring me and making the world a better place for all.  
The author would also like to thank Texas Tech University Law Librarian 
Eugenia Charles-Newton for her excellent research assistance.  I also 
appreciated the helpful revisions and comments from Professor Chris Kulander, 
Mrs. Charles-Newton, Connor Warner, and Jessica Zalin. 
 1. See 81% Say Finding New Energy Sources is Urgent National Need, 
RASMUSSEN REPORTS (Aug. 7, 2008), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/ 
public_content/politics/current_events/environment_energy/81_say_finding_new
_energy_sources_is_urgent_national_need [hereinafter 81% Say Finding New 
Energy Sources]. 
 2. See 75% Say U.S. Not Doing Enough To Develop Its Gas And Oil 
Resources, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (June 29, 2011), 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/enviro
nment_energy/75_say_u_s_not_doing_enough_to_develop_its_gas_and_oil_resou
rces. (Providing that: 
Most voters continue to feel America needs to do more to develop 
domestic gas and oil resources.  They also still give the edge to 
finding new sources of oil over reducing gas and oil consumption. . . . 
just 19% believe the United States does enough to develop its own 
gas and oil resources.  Seventy-five percent . . . do not think the 
country is doing enough in this area.). 
 3. See Macon Phillips, President Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address, THE 
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jan. 21, 2009, 1:27 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/ 
1
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also supports energy independence.4  Such widespread support 
for the development of domestic energy resources may exist5 
because the issue directly relates to national security.6  As the 
foreign regions that the United States has typically relied upon 
for fossil fuels become increasingly unstable,7 domestic energy 
resources must remain available in order to support the 
American populace and economy.  In response to these opinions 
and pressures, the United States is already actively engaged in 
diversifying its energy asset portfolio and searching for domestic 
sources of energy.8  “As David Rothkopf, a Carnegie Endowment 
 
inaugural-address (“[A]nd each day brings further evidence that the ways we 
use energy strengthen our adversaries and threaten our planet. . . . We will 
harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our 
factories.”); see also 81% Say Finding New Energy Sources, supra note 1 (“‘For 
the sake of our economy, our security and the future of our planet, we must end 
the age of oil in our time,’ Democrat Barack Obama said . . . . Obama champions 
the development of renewable energy sources like wind and solar . . . ”);  see also 
Tracey A. LeBeau, The Green Road Ahead: Renewable Energy Takes a Stumble 
But is on the Right Path, Possibly Right Through Indian Country, 56 FED. LAW. 
38, 40 (2009) (“[A] new administration has its sights on utilizing the renewable 
sector as the linchpin in its economic plans to move the United States, once 
again, into a new economic era – the age of green energy.”). 
 4. See Current Political Issues: Energy, REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, 
http://www.gop.com/index.php/issues/issues (“We believe in energy 
independence.  We support an ‘all of the above’ approach that encourages the 
production of nuclear power, clean coal, natural gas, solar, wind, geothermal, 
hydropower, as well as offshore drilling in an environmentally responsible 
way.”). 
 5. See Tracey A. LeBeau, Energy Security and Increasing North American 
Oil and Gas Production, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 193, 193 (2002) 
[hereinafter Energy Security]. 
 6. See id. (“The combination of the new war on terrorism, domestic economic 
pressures, and increasing tensions in the Middle East has heightened the 
concern of many legislators and the Bush administration on the United States’ 
reliance on foreign, and potentially unreliable, sources of oil, a concern 
expressed as an energy security risk.”). 
 7. See CNA CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
6 (2007), available at http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/news/FlipBooks/ 
Climate%20Change%20web/flipviewerxpress.html (“Climate change acts as a 
threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world.  
Projected climate change will seriously exacerbate already marginal living 
standards in many Asian, African, and Middle Eastern nations, causing 
widespread political instability and the likelihood of failed states.”). 
 8. See LeBeau, supra note 3, at 39 (Providing that: 
Last year witnessed record growth, retraction, and gyrations in 
investment and financing activity in the renewable energy sectors.  
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/4
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scholar, recently noted, ‘Making America the world’s greenest 
country is not a selfless act of charity or naïve moral indulgence.  
It is now a core national security and economic interest.’”9 
Given this need to grow and to diversify the American energy 
portfolio and an American public that generally supports 
developing domestic energy resources, politicians are increasingly 
likely to look domestically to incorporate a variety of sources and 
types of energy into America’s energy portfolio.  When looking for 
potential domestic energy resources, Indian country10 stands 
out.11  Former Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell made the 
connection between the need for domestic energy production and 
Indian country when he stated: 
I think America has to kick the habit on depending on foreign 
energy and start producing more of its own energy.  One answer 
 
It has been estimated that, when the final numbers come in, the 
capacity of new wind generation in 2008 will have reached nearly 
7,500 megawatts (at least 35 percent of new capacity added), 
bringing total installed wind capacity in the United States to about 
24,000 mega-watts.  According to some estimates, the solar industry 
will have nearly double installations of solar photovoltaic modules 
that same year.) (citations omitted) 
See also Andrea S. Miles, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements:  Tools for 
Achieving Energy Development and Tribal Self-Sufficiency or an Abdication of 
Federal Environmental and Trust Responsibilities?, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 461 
(2005-2006). 
 9. LeBeau, supra note 3, at 41. 
 10. The term “Indian Country” refers to specific areas of land, defined as: 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through 
the reservation, 
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the 
United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired 
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, 
and 
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been 
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same. 
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006). 
 11. See LeBeau, supra note 3, at 42 (“The road to an area of great promise for 
a sustainable renewable energy market leads directly to – and through – Indian 
Country.  Indian reservations, especially throughout the western United States, 
are rich in conventional energy resources that remain largely undeveloped.”); see 
also Miles, supra note 8, at 462. 
3
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to our energy future is in the domestic production, and I just 
don’t mean in ANWR either. . . . 
  . . . Indian-owned energy resources are still largely 
undeveloped – 1.81 million acres are being explored or in 
production, but about 15 million more acres of energy resources 
are undeveloped. . . . 
  There are 90 tribes that own significant energy resources, 
both renewable and nonrenewable.12 
Former Senator Campbell is not alone in his belief that 
substantial energy resources exist within Indian country.  “The 
Bureau of Indian Affairs estimates that while Indian land 
comprises only five percent of the land area in the United States, 
it contains an estimated ten percent of all energy resources in the 
United States.”13  With regard to traditional energy sources, 
“Native American reservations contain large reserves of oil and 
gas.  There are an estimated 890 million barrels of oil and natural 
gas liquids, and 5.5 trillion cubic feet of gas on tribal lands.”14  In 
 
 12. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act and the Native American Energy 
Development and Self-Determination Act: Hearing on S. 424 and S. 522 Before 
the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (statement of Sen. Ben 
Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs) [hereinafter 
Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing]. 
 13. DOUGLAS C. MACCOURT, RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY:  A HANDBOOK FOR TRIBES  1 (2010); see also Judith V. Royster, 
Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian Tribal Energy 
Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065, 1066-
67 (2008); see also Energy Policy Act of 2003, 149 CONG. REC. S5,751 (daily ed. 
May 6, 2003) (statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman) (“[E]nergy resources on Indian 
land in the U.S. have not been as extensively developed as they might be.  
According to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, over 90 Indian reservations have 
significant untapped energy resource potential.  That includes oil and gas, coal, 
coalbed methane, wind and geothermal resources.”). 
 14. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 73 
(statement of Vicky Bailey, Assistant Sec’y for Policy and Int’l Affairs, Dep’t of 
Energy); see also 149 CONG. REC. S7459 (daily ed. June 5, 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs). 
Even though in one year alone over 9.3 million barrels of oil, 229 
billion cubic feet of natural gas, and 21 million tons of coal were 
produced from Indian land, representing $700 million in Indian 
energy revenue, the Department of Interior estimates that only 25 
percent of the oil and less than 20 percent of all natural gas reserves 
on Indian land have been fully developed. 
Id. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/4
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addition to traditional energy resources, Indian country also has 
substantial potential for development of alternative energy 
resources.  In particular, there is huge potential for wind15 and 
solar16 energy development within certain regions of Indian 
country.  As a result, “Indian tribes stand in a unique nexus 
between renewable energy resources and transmission of 
electricity in key areas of the West.”17 
Recognizing the potential key role that tribes will play in the 
development of the country’s energy resources, both the 
Department of Energy (DOE) and some in Congress recognize 
that Indian tribes should be included in plans to develop these 
energy resources.18  As a result, “[w]hile the movement toward 
energy independence is an important opportunity for tribes, the 
present political climate also offers tremendous opportunities for 
tribes to use their renewable resources to enter into the power-
producer market and play an important role in regional and 
national energy planning.”19 
Mirroring this desire, many tribes are also becoming 
interested in energy development opportunities: 
Perhaps more importantly, tribes are beginning to perceive 
renewable energy development in a positive light, as something 
 
 15. MACCOURT, supra note 13, at 1-2 (“NREL has estimated that there is the 
potential for about 535 billion kWh/year of wind energy alone available on 
Indian lands in the contiguous 48 states, which is equivalent to 14 percent of 
current U.S. total annual energy generation.”); Kathleen R. Unger, Change is in 
the Wind:  Self-Determination and Wind Power Through Tribal Energy Resource 
Agreements, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 329, 334 (2009) (“Tribal lands have substantial 
wind resources.  The Energy Information Administration has identified almost 
one hundred reservations with winds great enough for energy development 
projects.  Reservations on the Great Plains offer approximately 200 gigawatts of 
wind power potential – roughly one-third of the electrical capacity for the entire 
nation.”) (citations omitted); Donald M. Clary, Commercial-Scale Renewable 
Energy Projects on Tribal Lands, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 19, 19 (2011). 
 16. MACCOURT, supra note 13, at 2 (“NREL estimates that there is also 
17,600 billion kWh/year of solar energy potential on Indian lands in the lower 48 
states; this amount is equivalent to 4.5 times the total U.S. electrical generation 
in 2004.”). 
 17. LeBeau, supra note 3, at 44. 
 18. Debbie Leonard, Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Law of Federal Reserved 
Water Rights:  The Potential Impact on Renewable Energy Development, 50 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 611, 638 (2010). 
 19. Id. 
5
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that is consistent with tribal culture and values.  Many tribal 
leaders now see renewable energy as a vehicle for economic 
development in areas that may no longer be (or never were) 
suitable for agricultural development.  Some also see this as a 
way for tribes to play a positive role in the nation’s energy 
future.20 
Accordingly, energy development in Indian country is attractive 
to the federal government.  It both advances the federal interests 
discussed above, and provides some tribes a method to achieve 
economic diversification, promote tribal sovereignty and self-
determination, and provide employment and other economic 
assistance to tribal members. 
Despite the foregoing, extensive energy development within 
Indian country has yet to happen.  Former Senator Campbell 
explained why this may be the case: 
  The answer lies partly in the fact that energy resource 
development is by its very nature capital intensive.  Most tribes 
do not have the financial resources to fund extensive energy 
projects on their own and so must partner with private industry, 
or other outside entities, by leasing out their energy resources for 
development in return for royalty payments. . . . The unique legal 
and political relationship between the United States and Indian 
tribes sometime makes this leasing process cumbersome. 
  . . . . 
  The Committee on Indian Affairs has been informed over the 
year that the Secretarial approval process is often so lengthy that 
outside parties, who otherwise would like to partner with Indian 
tribes to develop their energy resources are reluctant to become 
entangled in the bureaucratic red tape that inevitably 
accompanies the leasing of Tribal resources.21 
Recognizing the importance of energy development in Indian 
country, the need to promote such development, and the fact that 
the existing structure for energy development in Indian country 
may actually act as a disincentive to private investors, Congress 
 
 20. Donald M. Clary, Commercial-Scale Renewable Energy Projects on Tribal 
Lands, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 19, 23 (2011). 
 21. 149 CONG. REC. S7459-60 (daily ed. June 5, 2003) (statement of Senator 
Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/4
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passed the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-
Determination Act of 2005 as part of the Energy Policy Act of 
2005.22  In relevant part, the Act allows tribes who have met 
certain requirements to “enter into a lease or business agreement 
for the purpose of energy resource development on tribal land” 
without review by or approval of the Secretary of the Interior, 
which would otherwise be required under applicable federal 
law.23  In order to qualify, a tribe must enter into a Tribal Energy 
Resource Agreement (TERA) with the Secretary of the Interior.24  
The Secretary must approve the TERA if the tribe meets several 
requirements.25  One of these requirements is of particular 
importance to this article.  Tribes are required to “establish 
requirements for environmental review,”26 which must mirror the 
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA).27  In addition, the Indian Tribal Energy Development 
 
 22. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, tit. V, 119 Stat. 594, 763-
779 (2005). 
 23. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1) (2006). 
 24. Id. § 3504(b). 
 25. Id. § 3504(e). 
 26. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(VI). 
 27. At a minimum, tribes must include the following in the environmental 
review provisions contained within a TERA: 
(i) the identification and evaluation of all significant environmental 
effects (as compared to a no-action alternative), including effects on 
cultural resources; 
(ii) the identification of proposed mitigation measures, if any, and 
incorporation of appropriate mitigation measures into the lease, 
business agreement, or right-of-way; 
(iii) a process for ensuring that – 
(I) The public is informed of, and has an opportunity to comment on, 
the environmental impacts of the proposed action; and 
(II) Responses to relevant and substantive comments are provided, 
before tribal approval of the lease, business agreement, or right-of-
way; 
(iv) sufficient administrative support and technical capability to 
carry out the environmental review process; and 
(v) oversight by the Indian tribe of energy development activities by 
any other party under any lease, business agreement, or right-of-way 
entered into pursuant to the tribal energy resource agreement, to 
determine whether the activities are in compliance with the tribal 
energy resource agreement and applicable Federal environmental 
laws.  
7
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and Self-Determination Act of 2005 expounds upon the federal 
government’s trust responsibility to tribes as related to TERAs.  
Specifically, the Act states: 
[N]othing in this section shall absolve the United States from any 
responsibility to Indians or Indian tribes, including, but not 
limited to, those which derive from the trust relationship or from 
any treaties, statutes, and other laws of the United States, 
Executive orders, or agreements between the United States and 
any Indian tribe.28 
However, the Act goes on to provide that “the United States shall 
not be liable to any party (including any Indian tribe) for any 
negotiated term of, or any loss resulting from the negotiated 
terms of, a lease, business agreement, or right-of-way executed 
pursuant to and in accordance with a tribal energy resource 
agreement.”29  The Act’s mandated environmental review, 
statement on the federal government’s trust responsibility, and 
general waiver of the federal government’s liability will all be 
discussed in much greater detail below as they relate to why 
tribes have not taken advantage of the Act’s TERA provisions. 
From the text of the Act, it may be inferred that Congress 
hoped to promote energy development in Indian country by 
“streamlining” the bureaucratic process (i.e., removing the 
requirement of Secretarial approval for tribes that enter into a 
TERA with the Department of Interior).  In 2003, Senator 
Domenici confirmed this conclusion, explaining the purpose of the 
then-proposed TERA provisions as follows: 
  The Indian people of the United States are the proprietors of 
large amounts of property.  On this property and in this property 
lie various assets and resources . . . . 
  [T]he purpose of this bill will be to say to our Indian people, if 
you want to develop resources in the field of energy that lie 
within your lands, we are giving you the authority to do so and 
hopefully in a streamlined manner so that it will not be forever 
bogged down in the red-tape and bureaucracy of Indian lands 
 
Id. § 3504(e)(2)(C). 
 28. Id. § 3504(e)(6)(B). 
 29. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(D)(ii). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/4
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being subject to the Federal Government’s fiduciary 
relationships.30 
Tribal representatives initially indicated support for the TERA 
provisions, as the TERAs allowed for increased tribal self-
determination and also encouraged efficiency in energy 
development in Indian country.31 
In addition to tribal and federal governmental interests in 
the TERA provisions, third party investors may also be interested 
in TERAs, because “[i]f a TERA is properly structured, a mineral 
developer should gain greater certainty and efficiency in the 
development of energy resources on tribal lands.”32  In this way, 
the TERA provisions represent a rare instance in the history of 
tribal-federal relations where both tribes and the federal 
government may benefit from a partnership.  However, despite 
 
 30. 149 CONG. REC. S5748 (daily ed. May 6, 2003) (statement of Sen. Pete 
Domenici). 
 31. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 104 
(statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation); see also Letter from 
Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation, to Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell 
(Apr. 9, 2003) (available at Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra 
note 12, at 108) (“Generally speaking, the concept of turning tribal resource 
management over to tribes while ‘eliminating’ federal oversight would seem to 
be a very simple infusion of sovereignty into the current statutory and 
regulatory scheme governing tribal resource development. The Navajo Nation 
certainly supports this general concept.”). 
 32. Scot W. Anderson, ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE, The Indian 
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005: Opportunities 
for Cooperative Ventures 3 (2005), available at http://www.dgslaw.com/ 
documents/articles/670412.pdf.  Mr. Anderson went on to explain why this is the 
case, stating: 
The TERA is also an opportunity for a tribe to market its commercial 
and legal environment to potential mineral developers.  A TERA can 
assure investors of a stable investment environment by describing 
and incorporating an appropriate limited waiver of the Tribe’s 
defense of sovereign immunity, and by setting forth a clearly defined 
process for resolving disputes.  The certainty provided by a TERA 
can assist energy developers and tribes in securing financing for 
energy projects on tribal lands.  Many investors and energy 
developers also want to know that they have an [sic] clear way to 
exit from a project.  The TERA can set forth rules and principles 
governing the assignment and transfer of interest, and in that 
manner assist energy developers in designing their exit strategy. 
Id. at 16. 
9
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this possibility, not a single tribe has taken advantage of the 
“streamlining” opportunity presented by the TERA provisions. 
Despite the attractiveness of increased energy development 
in Indian country, tribes have failed to take advantage of the 
existing TERA provisions because they represent a mixture of 
federal paternalism, oversight, and limited liability that is not 
attractive to tribes.  This article examines more deeply why tribes 
have, to date, failed to take advantage of the TERA provisions 
and then makes recommendations as to how TERA might be 
reformed in order to increase tribal participation.  Accordingly, 
Section II examines the underlying purpose of the TERA 
provisions and associated legislative history.  Three categories of 
tribal concerns related to the TERA provisions emerge following a 
review of the applicable legislative history.  Each of these 
categories is explored in depth.  Next, Section III discusses the 
general ability of tribes to develop their energy resources.  This 
Section also discusses why such development may be generally 
attractive to tribes.  The Section concludes that some tribes have 
both the capacity to, and economic interest in, developing their 
energy resources.  Given the foregoing, Section IV theorizes that 
tribes have failed to enter into TERA agreements due to the 
concerns represented in the related legislative history.  As a 
result, Section V presents two alternative proposals for reform, 
arguing that should either proposal be adopted by Congress, the 
likelihood that tribes would be willing to enter into TERA 
agreements would increase.  Ultimately, this article concludes 
that adoption of either of the proposed TERA reforms will spur 
tribal promulgation of TERAs with the Secretary of Interior. 
II. PURPOSE OF AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
RELATED TO TRIBAL ENERGY RESOURCE 
AGREEMENTS 
In order to better understand the TERA provisions and 
identify potential tribal concerns with the provisions, review of 
the legislative history behind enactment of the TERA provisions 
is helpful.  Although legislative history is limited in that it does 
not reflect the understanding of all members of Congress, it may 
assist in understanding the issues raised in Congress as related 
to the TERA provisions.  Moreover, considering the legislative 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/4
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history behind the TERA provisions aids in understanding what a 
few key congressmen, such as then-Senators Bingaman (D-NM) 
and Campbell (R-CO), hoped to accomplish by incorporating the 
TERA provisions into the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
As an initial starting point, bills submitted by both Senators 
Bingaman and Campbell in 2002 served as the basis for the 
TERA provisions;33 these bills were revised and resubmitted for 
consideration in 2003.  On March 19, 2003, the Senate Committee 
on Indian Affairs held a hearing on two proposed amendments to 
the then-pending draft Energy Policy Act of 2005.34  On February 
14, 2003, Senator Bingaman introduced S. 424, “To Establish, 
Reauthorize, and Improve Energy Programs Relating to Indian 
Tribes.”35  On March 5, 2003, Senator Campbell introduced S. 
522, “To Amend the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to Assist Indian 
Tribes in Developing Energy Resources.”36 
In addition to wanting to promote domestic energy 
production, Congress seemingly also intended to promote tribal 
sovereignty and self-determination by enacting the Indian Tribal 
Energy Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005.37  
Theresa Rosier, Counselor to the Assistant Secretary for Indian 
Affairs within the Department of Interior, explained that “[w]e 
[the Department of Interior] are supportive of having tribes have 
more self-determination and have more responsibility in the 
development of renewable and nonrenewable energies on their 
lands.”38  In an effort to help promote tribal self-determination 
and to make energy development in Indian country easier and 
more efficient,39 Congress adopted the Act to help streamline the 
process of energy development within Indian country. 
 
 33. See 149 CONG. REC. S7460 (daily ed. June 5, 2003) (statement of Sen. Ben 
Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs); 149 CONG. REC. 
S7684 (daily ed. June 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman). 
 34. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 1 
(statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Miles, supra note 8. 
 38. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Hearing, supra note 12, at 76 (statement of 
Theresa Rosier, Counselor to the Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, Dep’t of the 
Interior). 
 39. See Unger, supra note 15. 
11
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A review of the legislative history associated with specific 
aspects of the Act suggests that concerns related to the TERA 
provisions can generally be grouped into one of three categories, 
including: (1) the tribal trust relationship; (2) the institution of 
mandatory tribal environmental review provisions; and (3) the 
waiver of the federal government’s liability once a tribe has 
entered into a TERA.  At the outset of congressional discussion of 
the pending legislation, Senator Bingaman expressed his 
concerns related to two of these categories: 
Unfortunately, in my view, the provisions have been marred by a 
proposal to make energy leasing on Indian lands both exempt 
from environmental analysis under NEPA, and exempt from the 
normal trust protections afforded Indian tribes.  I fear this is a 
substantial flaw that needs to be addressed if the bill is to keep 
its balance among energy, environment, and the public 
interest.40 
Accordingly, to better understand why tribes have been reticent 
to adopt TERAs, the discussion below more fully explores the 
legislative history related to these two categories, as well as the 
third category of the waiver of the federal government’s liability. 
A. Federal Trust Responsibility to Tribes 
Several comments related to the TERA provisions focused on 
the potential impacts of the then-proposed provisions on the 
federal government’s trust responsibility to federally-recognized 
tribes.41  In order to understand the legal context of these 
 
 40. 149 CONG. REC. S5751 (daily ed. May 6, 2003) (statement of Sen. Jeff 
Bingaman). 
 41. There are generally thought to be three categories of claims that can be 
brought by tribes against the federal government.  These three categories 
include: (1) general trust claims; (2) bare/limited trust claims; and (3) full trust 
claims.  The cases discussed infra, Cherokee Nation, Worcester, Kagama and 
Lone Wolf, may be used as the basis to form a claim under the first category of 
trust responsibility cases – a general trust claim.  Based on these cases and the 
historic relationship between the federal government and federally recognized 
tribes, it may be argued that liability exists.  However, a claim based on a 
general trust responsibility is usually unsuccessful if the sole basis of the claim 
is the federal government’s general trust responsibility to tribes.  Later, the 
Court recognized a second category of liability under the federal trust 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/4
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questions, one must understand the federal trust responsibility to 
tribes. 
B. Historical Development of the Federal Trust 
Responsibility to Tribes 
Understanding the history and nuances of the trust 
responsibility to federally recognized tribes is critical in 
understanding the legislative history behind the TERA 
provisions.42  One must look to three foundational cases of federal 
 
responsibility – a claim for breach of a bare or limited trust responsibility.  In 
1980, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) 
[hereinafter Mitchell I].  In Mitchell I, the Court considered whether the 
Secretary of the Interior was liable under section  5 of the General Allotment 
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 348, for an alleged breach of trust related to the management of 
timber resources and related funds.  Id. at 537-38.  Although the General 
Allotment Act included language that land was to be held “in trust,” the Court 
concluded that this language only created a bare trust responsibility because the 
Act did not require that the federal government manage the land.  Id. at 542-43.  
Because the Act did not place any affirmative management duties on the federal 
government, the Court held in favor of the Secretary. Id. at 545.  However, in 
1983, the Court considered a related breach of trust claim from the same tribe in 
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) [hereinafter Mitchell II].  Mitchell 
II differed from Mitchell I, however, because in Mitchell II the tribe based its 
claim on several statutes that had not been at issue in Mitchell I, arguing that 
these statutes created an affirmative duty for the Secretary to manage the lands 
in question. Id. at 210-11.  The Court agreed with the tribe, finding that the 
statutes in question “clearly give the Federal Government full responsibility to 
manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of the Indians.”  Id. at 224.  
Having determined liability for the breach of trust, the Court then turned to 
private trust law precedent to determine the extent of the federal government’s 
liability, as the statutes did not expressly require compensation.  Id. at 226.  The 
Court’s decision in Mitchell II is an example of the third category of trust cases – 
a claim based on a full trust responsibility. 
 42. In fact, Senator Inouye provided substantial explanation of the history 
and legal importance of the federal trust responsibility when discussing the 
then-proposed amendments by Senators Campbell and Bingaman: 
     The large body of Federal Indian law is known as trust 
responsibility, and it was first given expression by the Chief Justice 
of the United States Supreme Court, John Marshall, in 1832.  This 
relationship is premised upon the sovereignty of the Indian nations, 
a sovereignty that existed well before the U.S. government was 
formed, and it is memorialized in the United States Constitution. 
     This trust relationship that has always formed the course of 
dealings between the U.S. and Indian tribes is well understood and 
beyond debate.  The United States holds legal title to lands that it 
held in trust for Indian tribes.  Accordingly, activities affecting 
13
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Indian law, also known as the Marshall Trilogy,43 in order to 
comprehend the genesis of the modern federal trust 
responsibility.44  Two of the three cases, Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia45 and Worcester v. Georgia,46 are particularly important 
in this regard.  Cherokee Nation recognized the separate 
 
Indian lands and resources have always been the subject of approval 
by the Secretary of the Interior Department, acting as the principal 
agent for the United States. . . .  
     In the Congress, we have always understood the United States 
trust responsibility as being derived from treaties, statutes, 
regulations, executive orders, rulings and agreements between the 
Federal Government and Indian tribal governments. . . .  
     . . .  
     With the Government’s advocacy for a new perspective on the 
United States trust responsibility, it is readily apparent why the 
eyes of Indian country are sharply focused on the tribal provisions of 
this bill and the amendments that are the subject of our discussion 
today.   
     Native America wants to see what position the Congress will 
adopt as it relates to the ongoing viability of the trust relationship.  
They are closely scrutinizing our words and our actions in the 
context of this measure to determine whether they signal a 
departure from the traditional and well-established principles of the 
United States trust responsibility. 
149 CONG. REC. S7687-88 (daily ed. June 11, 2001). 
 43. The “Marshall Trilogy” is a reference to Chief Justice Marshall of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall 
Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. Rev. 627 (1964). 
 44. The first of these cases, Johnson v. McIntosh, has less direct relevance to 
this discussion than the other two cases. This case raised the question of 
whether land grants made by tribal chiefs before the passage of the Trade and 
Intercourse Acts were valid. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 543-
45 (1823).  The Court held that these grants were invalid because the Doctrine 
of Discovery conveyed title to Great Britain, as the conquering European 
sovereign, and the United States of America obtained title to all land when it 
succeeded from Great Britain.  Id. at 587-88.  As a result, American Indians only 
retained a right of occupancy in the land.  Id. at 592; see also Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 
(1832). 
 45. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).  In Cherokee Nation, the 
Court addressed whether its original jurisdiction extended to Indian nations.  In 
holding that it did not, the Court reasoned that Indian nations were not foreign 
nations, but, rather, “domestic dependent nations.”  Id. at 17. 
 46. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).  In Worcester, the Court 
considered whether the laws of Georgia applied within the territory of the 
Cherokee Nation.  The Court concluded that the laws of Georgia had no force or 
effect within Indian country.  
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sovereignty of tribal nations.47  At the same time, however, Chief 
Justice Marshall explained that in many respects, tribal nations 
had given up aspects of their external sovereignty to the federal 
government.48  Worcester held that the laws of states generally do 
not apply in Indian country.49  Taken together, Cherokee Nation 
and Worcester stand for several important principles.  First, in 
becoming “dependent” nations, tribes became reliant on the 
federal government and, therefore, the federal government owed 
tribal nations external protection.  Second, because of this 
historical relationship between tribal nations and the federal 
government, the relationship is primarily of a federal character. 
The United States Supreme Court was relatively silent on 
the issue of federal Indian law following its decision in Worcester 
until the Major Crimes Act was challenged, approximately fifty 
years later.50  In United States v. Kagama, the Court determined 
that Congress had the authority to enact the Major Crimes Act.51  
In reaching this decision, the Court stated that the United States 
owes Indian tribes a “duty of protection” and, therefore, the 
federal government has plenary authority over Indian country.52  
Since this time, the federal government has exercised substantial 
authority in Indian country. 
Three cases demonstrate the modern application of the 
federal trust responsibility to tribes: United States v. White 
Mountain Apache Tribe,53 United States v. Navajo Nation,54 and 
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation.55  In United States v. 
White Mountain Apache, the Supreme Court considered a claim 
brought by a federally recognized tribe alleging that the federal 
government had failed to adequately manage Fort Apache for the 
benefit of the tribe.56  The statute at issue required the federal 
 
 47. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 515. 
 50. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). 
 51. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); see also Lone Wolf v. 
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
 52. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 385. 
 53. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003). 
 54. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003). 
 55. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011). 
 56. See generally White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465. 
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government to hold Fort Apache in trust for the tribe and, 
importantly, gave the federal government “authority to make 
direct use of portion of the trust corpus.”57  As a result, the Court 
determined that the tribe had sufficiently alleged a breach of 
trust claim on a full trust (similar to the trust at issue in Mitchell 
II), and awarded the tribe damages.58 
In United States v. Navajo Nation, the Court did not find in 
favor of the tribe.59  Here, the Navajo Nation alleged that the 
Secretary of the Interior acted inappropriately in the negotiation 
of mineral leases on the Navajo Nation.60  Ultimately, although 
the Court acknowledged the unprofessional behavior of the 
Secretary of the Interior, the Court held that the Navajo Nation 
had failed to establish a full trust.61  This is because the statute 
in question gave the tribe the right to negotiate leases and, as a 
result, the Secretary of the Interior did not have full authority 
over management of the resources in question.62 
In both White Mountain Apache and Navajo Nation, the 
Court seemed to focus its analysis on the amount of control 
exercised by the federal government over the trust corpus in 
question.  Where the federal government had near complete 
control over the trust corpus, as in White Mountain Apache, the 
Court found in the tribe’s favor.  However, where the statute in 
question had given the tribe increased authority to negotiate 
 
 57. Id. at 475. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See generally Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488. 
 60. See id.; see also 149 CONG. REC. S7684 (daily ed. June 11, 2003) 
(statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman).  At the time the TERA provisions were being 
considered in Congress, the potential ramifications of the Navajo Nation 
decision were of concern.  For example, Senator Bingaman explained that: 
Tribal concern is driven by a decision three months ago by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Navajo Nation.  The 
Supreme Court specifically addressed the Federal trust 
responsibility and the standard for ensuring that statutes affecting 
Native Americans contain fiduciary duties by which the Federal 
Government as trustee can be held accountable for its actions that 
may have serious and negative impacts on tribal interests. 
Id. 
 61. See Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 514. 
 62. See id. at 511. 
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leases, as in Navajo Nation, the Court found in favor of the 
federal government. 
On June 13, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided United 
States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation.63  The Court’s decision in 
Jicarilla Apache Nation built on the Court’s past decisions 
regarding the extent of the federal trust relationship in Mitchell 
I, Mitchell II, Navajo Nation, and White Mountain Apache.  The 
issue before the Court concerned whether the common-law 
fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege applied to the 
United States when acting in its capacity as trustee for tribal 
trust assets.64  In concluding that the fiduciary exception did not 
apply, the Court explained that the federal government resembles 
a private trustee in only limited instances.65  The Court reasoned 
that “[t]he Government, of course, is not a private trustee.  
Though the relevant statutes denominate the relationship 
between the Government and the Indians is a ‘trust,’ see, e.g., 25 
U.S.C. § 162a, that trust is defined and governed by statutes 
rather than the common law.”66  Ultimately, the Court concluded 
that while common law principles may “inform our interpretation 
of statutes and [] determine the scope of liability that Congress 
has imposed . . . the applicable statutes and regulations ‘establish 
[the] fiduciary relationship and define the contours of the United 
States’ fiduciary obligations.’”67  Based on the foregoing, the 
 
 63. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011).  At issue 
in the underlying litigation was the federal government’s management of the 
Nation’s trust accounts from 1972 to 1992.  Asserting the attorney-client 
privilege and attorney work-product doctrine, the federal government declined 
to turn over 155 documents requested by the Nation.  The Nation filed a motion 
to compel production, and the Court of Federal Claims granted the motion in 
part.  The Court of Federal Claims found that communication relating to the 
management of the Nation’s trust funds fell within the “fiduciary exception” to 
the attorney-client privilege, and, as a result, that these documents should be 
produced.  The federal government petitioned the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit with a writ of mandamus to prevent disclosure, but the Court of 
Appeals upheld the Court of Federal Claims decision. 
 64. See id. at 2318. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. at 2323. 
 67. Id. at 2325 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983)).  The 
Court went on to explain that two features must exist in order for the common-
law fiduciary exception to apply:  (1) a “real client” and (2) duty to disclose 
17
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Court reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals to 
determine whether the court’s decision had met the standards for 
granting a writ of mandamus. 
Whether or not the federal trust responsibility is consistent 
with increased tribal sovereignty or self-determination turns on 
how one conceives of the federal trust responsibility.  On the one 
hand, the federal trust responsibility, when considered as an 
outgrowth of the Marshall trilogy of cases, may be perceived as a 
doctrine to protect tribes from federal and state infringement into 
internal tribal matters. 68  Alternatively, if based on the Kagama 
line of cases, the federal trust responsibility may be seen as 
“premised on dependency of tribes,” which supports continued 
federal involvement in tribal matters.69 
Both of these perspectives of the federal trust responsibility 
are represented in comments made regarding the then-pending 
TERA provisions.  For example, Senator Campbell’s comments 
and proposed amendment arguably represented the conception of 
the federal trust responsibility as originating in the Marshall 
trilogy of cases; Senator Bingaman’s comments and proposed 
amendment generally represent the viewpoint that the federal 
trust responsibility originates in the Kagama line of cases. 
C. Comments from the TERA Legislative History 
Related to the Federal Trust Relationship 
A review of the legislative history suggests that some 
commentators were concerned that the then-proposed TERA 
provisions would negatively impact the federal government’s 
trust responsibility to federally-recognized tribes.  These 
comments are more fully discussed below.  As an initial starting 
point, The Department of Interior and former Senator Campbell 
did not share this view.  On March 19, 2003, Theresa Rosier, 
Counselor to the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, 
 
information regarding the trust, and concluded that the present case lacked 
both factors.  Id. at 2316. 
 68. Reid Peyton Chambers, Compatibility of the Federal Trust Responsibility 
with Self-Determination of Indian Tribes:  Reflections on Development of the 
Federal Trust Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. 
FOUND. J. 13A-1, 13A-32 (2005). 
 69. Id. 
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Department of Interior, explained that the language in the bills 
provided “a limited trust responsibility” on behalf of the federal 
government to the tribes.70  On June 5, 2003, Senator Campbell 
agreed with Ms. Rosier’s prior testimony that the TERA 
provisions would not affect the federal government’s trust 
responsibilities to federally recognized tribes.71 
The majority of the comments related to the pending 
legislation’s impact on the federal trust responsibility, however, 
indicating a concern that the legislation would have a negative 
impact.  Some who testified before the Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs expounded upon what the federal government’s 
role under the TERA provisions should be, in light of the existing 
federal trust responsibility to tribes.  For example, David Lester, 
Executive Director of the Council for Energy Resource Tribes, 
stated that: 
As we saw in the Navajo case, the companies have no obligation 
to put all the information on the table for the tribes to know.  We 
believe that is a violation of the trust.  We think that the trust 
requires that the tribe be given assistance so that the 
 
 70. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 77 
(statements of Sen. Inouye, Member, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, and Theresa 
Rosier, Counselor to the Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, Dep’t of Interior). 
 71. 149 CONG. REC. S7460 (daily ed. June 5, 2003) (statement of Sen. Ben 
Nighthorse Campbell) (“Section 2604 also discusses the Secretary’s trust 
responsibility.  It expressly states that the section does not absolve the United 
States from that responsibility and expressly states that the Secretary will 
continue to have a trust obligation to protect a tribe when another party to a 
lease agreement or right-of-way is in breach.  It does not affect trust 
responsibility at all.”). 
  It is notable that the contours of the federal trust responsibility to tribes 
may have changed in the intervening years since these comments were made.  
As discussed above, the Court explained in Jicarilla Apache Nation that the 
federal government is only liable to tribes where a duty has been explicitly made 
clear in a treaty or statute.  United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 
2313, 2324-25 (2011).  Accordingly, the language of the TERA provisions 
becomes increasingly important in light of the Court’s recent decision in 
Jicarilla Apache Nation, as the Court seems to suggest that the federal 
government’s liability would be, in the case of TERAs, limited to the explicit 
provisions of the TERA.  It may therefore be the case that concerns raised 
during the hearings and discussions of the TERA provisions before adoption of 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 would be magnified as a result of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Jicarilla Apache Nation. 
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asymmetrical nature of the negotiations is removed and we have 
a level playing field.72 
Some, such as Chairman Vernon Hill of the Eastern 
Shoshone Business Council of the Wind River Indian Reservation, 
believed that the TERA provisions amounted to a violation of the 
federal government’s trust responsibilities to tribes.73  Perhaps 
Rebecca L. Adamson, in an e-mail to Senator Campbell, summed 
up these concerns best when she stated that “[t]hese bills appear 
to be designed as tools for trust ‘reform’ either overtly, by 
legislated abrogation of the government’s trust responsibility.”74  
Moreover, as exemplified by the May 6, 2003 statement of 
Senator Bingaman (included in the introduction to this Section), 
at least one Senator was concerned that the proposed TERA 
provisions represented a departure from the federal government’s 
historic trust responsibility to tribes.75  Based on the foregoing, 
except for a handful of commentators, most people who 
commented on the then-pending TERA provisions and their 
relationship to the federal trust responsibility seemed concerned 
that such provisions would negatively impact the federal 
government’s responsibility to federally recognized tribes. 
D. Mandatory Tribal Environmental Review 
In addition to concerns related to the status of the federal 
trust relationship following passage of the TERA provisions, 
commentators also expressed trepidation regarding the 
mandatory environmental review provisions included in the then-
pending Act.  In testimony before the Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs, Arvin Trujillo, Director of Navajo Natural 
Resources, highlighted that federal control of tribal affairs, such 
as mandating environmental review in Indian country, is at odds 
 
 72. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 88 
(statement of David Lester, Executive Dir., Council for Energy Resource Tribes). 
 73. Id. at 118-20 (statement of Vernon Hill, Chairman, E. Shoshone Bus. 
Council of the Wind River Indian Reservation).  
 74. Id. at 139 (statement of Rebecca L. Adamson, President, First Peoples 
Worldwide). 
 75. 149 CONG. REC. S5751 (daily ed. May 6, 2003) (statement of Sen. Jeff 
Bingaman). 
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with Indian self-determination.76  During the same hearing, 
Frank E. Maynes, tribal attorney for the Southern Ute Indian 
Tribal Chairman, expounded on concerns surrounding a 
federally-mandated process: 
The leasing and rights-of-way proposals of both pieces of 
legislation propose a trade that may be unacceptable to some 
tribes.  You eliminate the Secretarial approval in exchange for 
tribes’ regulations that require consultation with State officials, 
some type of public notification, and ultimately private citizen 
challenges of approved leases and rights-of-way.  Traditional 
notions of tribal sovereignty protect tribes from incursion of 
States and non-members in the decisionmaking process.  The 
Southern Ute Tribe believes this is the wrong approach.  We 
think that Congress should be concerned with whether or not the 
tribes are capable of making informed decisions in the first place 
and if they are capable of making those informed decisions, they 
should take the responsibility for their mistakes as well as for 
their goods decisions.77 
Mr. Maynes went on to explain that the proposed TERA 
provisions would treat tribal lands like public lands by essentially 
mandating that tribes adopt NEPA-like environmental 
regulations.78  Such mandatory regulations require tribes to 
comply with environmental regulations not applicable to the 
states.79 
 
 76. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 81  
(statement of Arvin Truijillo, Dir., Navajo Natural Res.). 
 77. Id. at 84 (statement of Frank E. Maynes, Tribal Att’y, for the S. Ute 
Indian Tribal Chairman, Howard D. Richards, Sr.). 
 78. Id. (“Tribes generally do not oppose Federal environmental laws.  But the 
proposed legislation shouldn’t treat tribal lands like public lands.  For example, 
NEPA requirements and public comment are inconsistent with the internal 
decision-making aspect of tribal sovereignty.”); see also id. at 155 (statement of 
Howard D. Richards, Sr., Chairman, S. Ute Indian Tribal Council). 
 79. Letter from Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation, to Sen. Ben 
Nighthorse Campbell (April 8, 2003), available at Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency 
Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 109 (“Thus, the regulatory requirement in S. 522 
as now drafted, since it would apply only to tribes, would actually be a step 
backward away from self-determination because tribes would be held to 
additional regulatory approval that states do not have to undergo.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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President Joe Shirley, Jr., of the Navajo Nation, shared these 
concerns related to potential infringement on tribal sovereignty 
in comments he submitted to the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs.80  He explained that such regulations were unnecessary 
as they were largely duplicative of existing federal environmental 
requirements already applicable in Indian country.81  One 
commentator, after reviewing the applicable legislative history, 
concluded that the mandated environmental review requirements 
would be “contrary to the twin-goals of fostering tribal self-
determination and promoting the efficient development of tribal 
minerals.”82 
Similarly, A. David Lester, Executive Director of the Council 
of Energy Resources Tribes (CERT), explained CERT’s misgivings 
regarding the mandatory environmental regulations: 
One of our major concerns is the process that will be used to 
challenge tribal decisions made under their own regulations.  
These regulations provided for in both bills have a built-in 
extensive environmental review process that involves public 
notice and comment.  Our view is that the right to appeal should 
be very limited and that any overriding of tribal decisions should 
be based on clear findings of failure of the tribe to follow its own 
rules.  S. 424 provides that only an “interested party” (a State or 
a person whose interests may be adversely affected) can petition 
the Secretary when a tribe allegedly violates its own siting 
regulations.  The new section of S. 522 contains similar 
requirements but appear to allow any person after exhaustion of 
tribal remedies, with or without a nexus to the project, to petition 
the Secretary for review of tribal compliance with its own 
regulations.  We believe this could cause great mischief for 
Indian energy development and urge the Committee to revisit 
this language.83 
 
 80. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 105 
(statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation) (“[B]oth bills authorize 
infringement of tribal sovereignty by subjecting internal tribal regulations to 
the public notice and comment process through the federal register.”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. ANDERSON, supra note 32, at 9. 
 83. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 124 
(statement of A. David Lester, Executive Dir., Council of Energy Resource 
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Not all who commented on the then-pending TERA 
provisions wanted to limit the mandatory environmental 
regulations imposed on tribes.  For example, Sharon Buccino, a 
senior attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
wanted to see the goals and purposes of NEPA promoted and 
protected through imposition of the TERA requirements on 
tribes.84  Furthermore, Senator Bingaman explained that many 
external parties, including national and local environmental 
groups, the National Association of Counties, and a bipartisan 
group of attorneys general from several states, seemed to strongly 
support the imposition of mandatory environmental review 
provisions on tribes entering into TERAs.85  He concluded that: 
  The concern expressed by those attorneys general and the 
counties underscores the fact that without some applicable 
Federal law related to the significant development activity 
contemplated under this section 2604, it is unclear what 
standard to apply. 
  . . . Tribal law can and should apply to energy development on 
tribal lands, but at the same time Congress has a responsibility 
to ensure that certain Federal parameters are in place.86 
 
Tribes); see also id. at 159 (statement of Maynes, Bradford, Shipps & Sheftel, 
LLP, Att’ys for the S. Ute Indian Tribe), stating: 
Essentially, the measures propose the elimination of Secretarial 
approval in exchange for the promulgation of tribal regulations that 
not only require consultation with State officials, but also require 
public notification and comment processes, and, ultimately, private 
citizen challenges of approved leases or rights-of-way based on 
allegations of non-compliance with tribal regulations.  Traditional 
notions of tribal sovereignty would protect tribes against the 
incursion of State governments or the views of non-members in the 
process of tribal decision-making.  To ask tribes to forsake such a 
fundamental aspect of sovereignty in exchange for the elimination of 
Secretarial approval, may simply be too much for most tribes. 
 84. Id. at 150-51 (statement of Sharon Buccino, Senior Att’y, Natural Res. 
Def. Council).  Ms. Buccino actually went so far as to request that the 
Committee add additional NEPA-like requirements to the then-proposed TERA 
provisions. 
 85. 149 CONG. REC. S7684 (daily ed. June 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. 
Bingaman). 
 86. Id. 
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Potentially in response to these concerns, on June 11, 2003, 
Senator Bingaman introduced an amendment to add the 
mandatory environmental review provisions to the then-pending 
TERA provisions.87 
Senator Campbell opposed Senator Bingaman’s proposed 
amendment, explaining that “[i]n my view, the Bingaman 
amendment would literally strip tribes of 30 years of that 
direction of self-determination and would circumvent the trust 
responsibilities this Government has to tribes because it would 
force the statutory equivalent of NEPA on all decisions they make 
with their own land.”88  Senator Domenici shared Senator 
Campbell’s concerns regarding the mandatory provisions in 
Senator Bingaman’s proposed amendment, adding that “the 
amendment before us takes the unprecedented step of applying 
the NEPA process to the Indian tribes just as if they were the 
Federal Government.  This amendment goes well beyond current 
environmental regulations and adds unnecessary regulations and 
costs to the tribal energy project.”89 
Accordingly, the legislative history demonstrates 
commentators’ concern about potential encroachments into tribal 
sovereignty and costs associated with the imposition of 
mandatory environmental review through the TERA provisions.  
These issues may explain in part tribes’ ongoing reluctance to 
enter into TERAs. 
E. Waiver of Federal Government’s Liability 
As identified above, another concern of several commentators 
on the then-pending TERA provisions related to the waiver of 
federal government liability to third parties or tribes related to 
matters arising after approval of a TERA.  On June 5, 2003, 
Senator Campbell explained the purpose of the liability waiver in 
the then-pending TERA provisions: 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at S7,686 (statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. 
Comm. on Indian Affairs). 
 89. Id. 
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Section 2604 provides that the United States will not be liable to 
any party, including a tribe, for losses resulting in the terms of 
any lease agreements or right-of-way executed by the tribe 
pursuant to the approved TERA, which makes sense; Liability 
follows responsibility.  If a tribe makes the leasing decisions, it 
should certainly be held responsible.  If the United States 
continues to make the leasing decisions, it will continue to be 
held responsible.  If Indian self-determination means anything, it 
means the right of tribes to make their own decisions and their 
responsibility to the tribes to live with those decisions.90 
Despite Senator Campbell’s sentiments, concerns regarding this 
provision pervade the legislative history.  Senator Bingaman 
acknowledged that the TERA provision waiving the federal 
government’s liability was controversial, in stating that “[t]here 
are concerns with language in the bill that limits the liability of 
the Federal Government with respect to leases and rights-of-way 
approved by tribes under the citing provisions of the bill.”91  
Chairman Vernon Hill shared this concern, explaining that given 
the government’s pervasive role in energy development in Indian 
country, tribes would be unlikely to release the federal 
government from liability until the implications of the 
streamlined process were clear.92 President Joe Shirley, Jr., 
shared and expounded upon the concerns raised by Chairman 
Hill, explaining that: 
  Both bills [submitted by Senator Bingaman and Senator 
Campbell] stipulate a waiver of federal liability, regardless of the 
degree of managerial control exercised by the federal government 
in Indian energy development. . . . 
  While these bills purport to put tribes in the driver seat of 
decision making, they continue to empower the federal 
government to act as the traffic cop who is authorized to put its 
hand out to stop a tribe’s car from moving.  Both bills ultimately 
 
 90. Energy Policy Act of 2003, 149 CONG. REC. S7461 (daily ed. June 5, 2003) 
(statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs). 
 91. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 75 
(statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman). 
 92. Id. at 83 (statement of Vernon Hill, Chairman, E. Shoshone Bus. Council 
of the Wind River Indian Reservation). 
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preserve the federal government’s final authority over energy 
leases.  Such final authority constitutes the lead role.  This 
scheme, wherein a cabinet Secretary has prescriptive control over 
decisions regarding Indian energy development, but no 
subsequent liability, is an abdication of the federal trust 
responsibility that is patently unfair to tribes.93 
President Shirley’s comments also highlight the connection 
between the federal trust relationship and concerns associated 
with waiver of the federal government’s liability following 
approval of TERAs. 
Moreover, in comments submitted to the Senate Committee 
on Indian Affairs, Chairman Hill further explained that the then-
proposed TERA regulations would disadvantage tribes that were 
not in the financial position to assume greater liability.94  
Conversely, the TERA provisions promote continued inequality 
between tribes, as those in an economic position to take on 
greater liability would be treated differently by the federal 
government.95 
In a letter from Jacqueline Johnson, Executive Director of 
the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI),96 to Senator 
Campbell, NCAI expressed discontent with the waiver of the 
federal government’s liability, explaining that “[w]e shared in 
their [tribes’ and tribal advocates’] concern regarding provisions 
that significantly limit the United States’ liability and release the 
Secretary of Interior from any accountability to Indian tribes for 
 
 93. Id. at 107 (statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation). 
 94. Id. at 118 (statement of Vernon Hill, Chairman, E. Shoshone Bus. 
Council of the Wind River Indian Reservation) (“Our Tribes are concerned that 
the streamlining proposals embodied in both bills would require participating 
Indian tribes to absorb all of the costs and liability associated with approving 
business leases and rights-of-way.  Many direct service tribes may not be 
prepared to assume these responsibilities and costs.”). 
 95. Id. at 155 (statement of Howard D. Richards, Sr., Chairman, S. Ute 
Indian Tribal Council) (“Third, those tribes that are willing and able to proceed 
without the supervision of the United States will be required to assume greater 
responsibility for their actions, including their mistakes.”). 
 96.  The National Congress of American Indians, founded in 1944,  is the 
oldest, largest and most representative American Indian and Alaska Native 
organization serving the broad interests of tribal governments and communities.  
See NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS, http://ncai.org/ (last visited Mar. 
23, 2012). 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/4
  
2012] TRIBAL ENERGY RESOURCE AGREEMENTS 837 
 
actions that she is required to undertake pursuant to the 
legislation.”97 
Nonetheless, the legislative history suggests that some 
individuals supported waiving the federal government’s liability 
for actions taken by tribes under the TERA provisions.  For 
example, Theresa Rosier of the Department of Interior agreed 
with then-Chairman Campbell that tribes should be liable where 
they maintained managerial control over the resources at issue 
and related decisions.98 
However, notably, on June 11, 2003, Senator Bingaman 
acknowledged that the waiver of the federal government’s 
liability likely violated the federal trust responsibility.  He stated 
that: 
Section 2604, the subject of our amendment here, as currently 
drafted does not meet the standards established by the Supreme 
Court.  In fact, it goes in the opposite direction.  It diminishes the 
Federal Government’s trust responsibility and accountability to 
tribes.  This is inconsistent with the current Federal policy of 
tribal self-determination and self-governance.99 
In reaction to his belief that the then-proposed TERA provisions 
violated the federal trust responsibility by waiving the federal 
government’s potential liability, Senator Bingaman proposed to 
amend the pending bill; his proposed amendment would have 
eliminated the waiver of federal liability.100 
Senator Campbell reacted powerfully to Senator Bingaman’s 
proposed amendment, stating that: 
  I take strong issue with another aspect of the Bingaman 
amendment having to do with the liability of the United States 
 
 97. Energy Policy Act of 2003, 149 CONG. REC. S7461 (daily ed. June 5, 2003).  
The NCAI letter went on to explain that “we were not satisfied with provisions 
pertaining to environmental review” as well. 
 98. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 96 
(statements of Sen. Ben Night-Horse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, and Theresa Rosier, Counselor to the Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, 
Dep’t of Interior). 
 99. Energy Policy Act of 2003, 149 CONG. REC. S7684 (daily ed. June 11, 
2003) (statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman). 
 100. Id. at S7685 (statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman). 
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for tribal decisions.  Under title III [of the pending bill], along 
with the power to create approved leases, agreements, and 
rights-of-ways without Secretarial approval, the tribes have the 
responsibility for the decisions they make. 
  Mr. Bingaman’s amendment in effect de-links the two, 
eliminating the language that says the Secretary will not be 
liable for losses arising under the terms of the leases the tribe 
negotiates on its own.  That would mean he would keep the 
Secretary on the hook for those losses arising from lease terms 
negotiated by the tribe, even though the Secretary has nothing to 
do with the negotiations.  I don’t think that is very good policy, 
frankly.101 
Despite Senator Campbell’s reaction to Senator Bingaman’s 
proposed amendment, a review of the legislative history related 
to this provision suggests that the majority of the commentators 
were concerned that the waiver of the federal government’s 
liability contained in the then-pending TERA provisions 
amounted to an abrogation of the federal government’s trust 
responsibility to federally recognized tribes.  This concern, like 
the issues previously examined, has likely contributed to tribes’ 
unwillingness to enter into a TERA. 
F. Insights Gained from Legislative History 
Generally, legislative history provides insight into the issues 
considered by policy makers; the legislative history behind the 
adoption of the TERA provisions is no different.  The above 
discussion sheds light on several points.  As previously suggested, 
the bulk of the comments associated with the TERA provisions 
fall into three categories: (1) concerns related to the impacts of 
the TERA provisions on the federal trust responsibility; (2) 
concerns related to the imposition of an environmental review 
program that must comply with federal mandates; and (3) 
concerns related to the waiver of the federal government’s 
liability. 
Legislative history also aids in understanding the underlying 
perspectives that contributed to the TERA provisions.  The 
 
 101. Id. (statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Indian Affairs). 
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Bingaman and Campbell amendments discussed on June 11, 
2003 are particularly notable in that they directly relate to the 
proposals suggested below.  Senator Bingaman’s amendment 
arguably represents a paternalistic or federal-focused viewpoint.  
As explained above, Senator Bingaman proposed an amendment 
that would have essentially mandated that all tribes comply with 
NEPA when developing energy projects in Indian country.  
Senator Bingaman’s justification for this was that the federal 
government has a responsibility to ensure that federal law was 
applied in Indian country.  Senator Bingaman’s proposed 
amendment would have also removed the general waiver of the 
federal government’s liability from the TERA provisions.  His 
stated reason for advocating for the removal of this liability 
waiver was that such a waiver violated the federal government’s 
trust responsibility.  These provisions of Bingaman’s proposed 
amendment were legally consistent in that they represent the 
viewpoint that the federal government should maintain a strong 
presence or oversight role in Indian country. 
Conversely, Senator Campbell’s proposed amendment 
demonstrates a perspective focused on tribal self-determination 
and sovereignty.  In this regard, Senator Campbell opposed 
imposition of NEPA-like environmental review mandates, as such 
mandates would impose upon tribal sovereignty.  Senator 
Campbell supported the general waiver of federal liability, 
however, explaining that if tribes undertake greater decision-
making authority, they should also take on potentially greater 
liability.  Senator Campbell’s proposed amendment, therefore, is 
perhaps more consistent with tribal sovereignty and self-
determination than Senator Bingaman’s amendment.  These 
themes will be revisited in Section V. 
III. TRIBES ARE WELL-POSITIONED TO TAKE THE 
LEAD IN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 
Section II of this article addressed the issues and concerns 
raised during the federal government’s consideration of the TERA 
provisions.  In discussing this issue, one should consider whether 
energy development in general – and the TERA provisions in 
particular – are attractive from a tribal perspective; this Section 
does so.  Energy development not only benefits the United States 
29
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as a whole but also has the potential to benefit Indian tribes.102  
As explained more fully below, many tribes are well-positioned to 
engage in energy development within their territories.  Many 
tribes are already participating in some form of energy 
development, from natural resource extraction to energy 
generation.  As a result, this section considers potential benefits 
for tribal communities from, and their demonstrated ability to 
engage in, energy development. 
Energy development within Indian country may bring much-
needed economic development and infrastructure to Indian 
communities.103  “[U]ncertainty about both the marketplace and 
policy gives Indian tribes a unique opportunity to become more 
active in supporting policies and solutions that address their own 
unique needs for infrastructure, diversification, and energy 
security.”104  Recently, tribes have looked to diversify their 
 
 102. See DOUGLAS C. MACCOURT, RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY:  A HANDBOOK FOR TRIBES 2 (2010), providing: 
In addition to the significant tribal control of land and resources in 
the U.S. and the national focus on renewable energy, tribal interest 
in renewable energy projects will also likely be fueled by each tribe’s 
long-term goals relating to sovereignty, sustainability, and financial 
security.  In Indian country the past decade has brought with it a 
renewed focus on tribal self-determination, with tribes asserting 
more control over their land, resources and self-governance.  
Renewable energy may support a wide range of tribal economic 
activities, from tourism and gaming to manufacturing and 
telecommunications.  Many tribes have also begun to experiment 
with their unique legal status to accelerate their economic 
development efforts.  Energy development is one way tribes are 
creating the infrastructure and capacity to achieve economic 
independence. 
 103. Angelique A. EagleWoman, Tribal Nation Economics: Rebuilding 
Commercial Prosperity in Spite of U.S. Trade Restraints – Recommendations for 
Economic Revitalization in Indian Country, 44 TULSA L. REV. 383, 406 (2008); 
LeBeau, supra note 3, at 42-43; Tracey A. LeBeau, Reclaiming Reservation 
Infrastructure:  Regulatory and Economic Opportunities for Tribal Development, 
12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 238 (2001) (“Reservation infrastructures, 
including basic services such as water, electricity, gas, and telecommunications, 
are currently incapable of supporting tribal populations.  The Census Bureau in 
November 2000 reported that native populations will nearly double in the next 
fifty years and might reach 4.4 million.”). 
 104. LeBeau, supra note 3, at, 38. 
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economies105 in order to generate revenue and create jobs.106  
Energy development, either through natural resource extraction 
or energy generation, may play an important role in tribal 
economies as many tribes move toward economic 
diversification.107  Energy development is therefore an attractive 
option for tribes interested in economic diversification. 
In addition to promoting economic diversification within 
tribes, energy development and generation may benefit tribal 
communities by providing much needed energy itself to people 
living on the reservations.108  As Senator Bingaman explained:  
Although some of our reservations are rich in energy resources, 
we have many people living on those reservations who, for 
example, have no electricity.  We need to help both in the 
 
 105. Financial Roundtable: Economic Diversification in Indian Country, 
TRIBAL GOVERNMENT GAMING (Apr. 4, 2011), http://tribalgovernmentgaming.com/ 
issue/tribal-government-gaming-2011/article/financial-roundtable-economic-
diversification-in-indian-country (last visited Aug. 22, 2011) [hereinafter 
Financial Roundtable]. 
 106. Id.; see also MICHAEL W. CAMERON, A PROTOTYPICAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION FOR NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBES (1990) (“As American 
Indian tribes continue their efforts to advance reservation standards of living, 
many are vigorously pursuing local economic development so as to provide 
employment and training for their citizens and revenue for tribal government 
programs.”). 
 107. See Leonard, supra note 18, at  630 (“Many states, municipalities, and 
tribes now see renewable energy not only as a source of ‘green’ power but also as 
a means of economic diversification.  Given the momentum toward renewable 
energy development, the time is ripe to implement such projects.”); Ernest 
Stevens, Jr., The Next Wave: Tribal Economic Diversification, INDIAN GAMING 20 
(Mar. 2007).  Discussion of the appropriate business structure of such energy 
development is beyond the scope of this article.  Given the numerous variations 
between tribal governments in Indian country, there are a multitude of options 
available to tribal governments.  For a discussion of the different economic and 
business structures available to different tribal governments as well as a 
recognition of the fact that each tribe may define a “successful enterprise” 
differently, see Mary Emery et al., Economic Development in Indian Country: 
Redefining Success, 4 ONLINE J. RURAL RES. & POL’Y 1 (2006). 
 108. Financial Roundtable, supra note 105 (“I have seen many tribes take the 
approach to first seek opportunities to reduce costs by supplying their own 
energy.”) (statement of Eric Trevan, President and CEO, National Center for 
American Indian Enterprise Development). 
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development of the resources and help to ensure that the benefits 
of that development inures to the actual tribal members.109   
Further, energy development in Indian country will lead to more 
jobs for people living within Indian country.110  Indian 
communities, many residents of which are poor, will benefit from 
the increased availability of energy and jobs.111 
Many tribes are currently engaged in some form of energy 
development.112  A long history of energy development and 
 
 109. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 75 
(statement of Sen.  Bingaman). 
 110. See, e.g., id. at 71 (statement of Theresa Rosier, Counselor to the 
Assistant Sec’y for Indian Affairs, Dep’t of the Interior) (“Increased energy 
development in Indian country means increased jobs.  In many Indian and 
Alaska Native communities, joblessness and underemployment are painfully 
acute.  More than ever, tribes need the job and training opportunities that go 
hand-in-hand with expanded mineral and energy development.”). 
 111. STEPHEN CORNELL & JOSEPH P. KALT, PATHWAYS FROM POVERTY:  
DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTION-BUILDING ON AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 3-5 
(1989); Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Sovereignty and Nation-Building: The 
Development Challenge in Indian Country Today, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. 
J. 187, 189 (1998). See also 149 CONG. REC. S7459 (daily ed. June 5, 2003) 
(statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs), stating that: 
Despite what we may read in the Washington Post or the New York 
Times about the so-called rich Indians and Indian gambling, it is 
also indisputable that Indians are the most economically-deprived 
ethnic group in the United States.  Unemployment levels are far 
above the national average, in some cases as high as 70 percent.  Per 
capita incomes are well below the national average.  They have 
substandard housing, poor health, alcohol and drug abuse, diabetes, 
amputations, and a general malaise and hopelessness, even suicide 
among Indian youngsters. 
 112. Judith V. Royster, Tribal Energy Development:  Renewables and the 
Problem of the Current Statutory Structures, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 91, 92 (2012) 
(“Energy development is the economic lifeblood of many Indian tribes.  A 
number of tribal economies are heavily dependent upon fossil fuel extraction, 
and for many tribes, fossil fuels are the single greatest source of tribal 
revenue.”) (citing Tribal Development of Energy Resources and the Creation of 
Energy Jobs on Indian Lands: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Indian and Alaska Native Affairs of the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 112th 
Cong. 44 (2011)  (statement of Irene C. Cuch, Ute Tribal Business Committee) 
(“[T]he Tribe’s primary source of income is from oil and gas.”)); Indian Energy 
Development: Oversight Hearing Before S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 
15 (2008) (testimony of Chairman Carl Venne, Crow Nation) (stating that “most 
of our governmental revenue is derived from” mineral development); Tribal 
Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 115 (statement of Vernon 
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natural resource extraction exists in Indian country.113  Within 
the past decade, tribes have increasingly tested their ability to 
branch out from their historical practice of providing access to 
energy resources through leases to third parties by self-
development and management of energy resources.  Moreover, 
those outside of Indian country have increasingly expressed a 
need for and interest in energy development within Indian 
country.114  The list of existing and proposed tribal energy 
projects extends from the proposed Navajo-owned wind farm 
project in Arizona115 to the proposed coal-to-liquids and biomass-
to-liquids Many Stars Project on the Crow Reservation in 
Montana.116  As a result of their historical and modern 
experiences, tribes have a demonstrated record of energy 
development.  Today, many tribes are able to accomplish such 
energy development in a sustainable manner, thereby reducing 
further environmental degradation.117 
Ultimately, energy development in Indian country is 
attractive to many tribes because of the potential benefits to the 
 
Hill, Chairman, Eastern Shoshone Business Council of the Wind River 
Reservation) (noting that oil and gas production “is the primary source of 
revenue for the Tribes”); see also Mireya Navarro, Navajos Hope to Shift from 
Coal to Wind and Sun, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2010, at A12, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/science/earth/26navajo.html?_r=l&emc=etal 
(reporting that coal accounts for more than one-third of the Navajo Nation 
operating budget, and is the largest source of revenue after government grants 
and taxes); LeBeau, supra note 103, at 239. 
 113. For a discussion of the history of energy development and natural 
resource extraction in Indian country, see Royster, supra note 13; LeBeau, supra 
note 103. 
 114. Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Alternative Energy Development in Indian Country:  
Lighting the Way for the Seventh Generation, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 449, 459 (2010); 
Leonard, supra note 18, at 630-31. 
 115. Navajo-owned Wind Farm in Works in Arizona, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY 
MEDIA NETWORK (Aug. 17, 2011), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ 
2011/08/navajo-owned-wind-farm-in-works-in-arizona/. 
 116. Project Overview, MANY STARS PROJECT, http://manystarsctl.com/ 
overview.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2011). 
 117. See LeBeau, supra note 3, at 44 (“Numerous tribes share a common 
cultural concept of walking in balance with the natural environment.  Walking 
‘the red road’ is a descriptive phrase that refers to the principle of walking the 
road of balance – living right and following the rules of the creator, among 
which is the need to take care of all living things so that they will, in turn, take 
care of you.”).  See also LeBeau, supra note 103, at 239. 
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tribal community, as well as the ability to help the entire nation 
meet its energy goals.118  Yet, despite the potential benefits and 
the demonstrated ability to engage in energy development, not a 
single Indian tribe has yet taken advantage of the “streamlining” 
benefits available under the TERA provisions of the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, as discussed above.  Tribal governments’ lack 
of interest in the TERA provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 is perplexing.  The ability of tribal governments to exercise 
their sovereignty in a meaningful and stable manner increases 
the likelihood of tribal economic development,119 something that 
is crucial to tribal governments.  Moreover, “TERAs offer the 
potential to significantly improve investor confidence and 
enhance the development of renewable energy projects on tribal 
lands.”120 
IV. A THEORY: THREE FACTORS DISCOURAGE 
TRIBAL ADOPTION OF TERAS 
Given the potential benefits to Indian country available to 
tribes through utilization of the TERA provisions, the fact that 
tribes have not taken advantage of this opportunity is perplexing.  
 
 118. See Tribes Hope to Model Southern Ute’s Successful Energy Development, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Apr. 2, 2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork. 
com/2012/04/02/tribes-hope-to-model-southern-utes-successful-energy-
development-106044; see also Leonard, supra note 18, at 636. 
 119. Cornell & Kalt, Sovereignty and Nation-Building, supra note 111, at 188-
89, providing that: 
But shaping those futures will require not simply the assertion of 
sovereignty – a claim to rights and powers – it will require the 
effective exercise of that sovereignty.  The task tribes face is to use 
the power they have to build viable nations before the opportunity 
slips away.  This is the major challenge facing Indian country today.  
It also is the key to solving the seemingly intractable problem of 
reservation poverty.  Sovereignty, nation-building, and economic 
development go hand in hand.  Without sovereignty and nation-
building, economic development is likely to remain a frustratingly 
elusive dream. 
A discussion of why tribal sovereignty is key to economic development in Indian 
country is beyond the scope of this article.  For a complete discussion, see 
generally id. Furthermore, for a discussion of how the promotion of tribal 
sovereignty is critical to natural resource development in Indian country, see 
Royster, supra note 13. 
 120. Clary, supra note 15, at 23. 
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The fact that tribes apparently requested streamlined procedures 
from the federal government,121 but yet have failed to take 
advantage of the streamlined provisions of TERAs122 compounds 
the oddness of this turn of events.  According to the Department 
of the Interior, “several tribes have expressed interest in 
obtaining information about Tribal Energy Resource Agreements 
(TERAs) and the TERA regulatory process, but that as of 
[December 1, 2010], no tribes had submitted a request to the 
Department to enter into a TERA.”123  On May 7, 2012, a 
representative of the Bureau of Indian Affairs confirmed that 
“[t]o date the Secretary has received no TERA applications and no 
TERAs have been approved.”124  Moreover, the stated purpose of 
Title V of the Energy Policy Act, which contains the TERA 
provisions, was to attract energy development to Indian 
country,125 but it has failed to do so.  As exemplified by the 
 
 121. LeBeau, supra note 5, at 44 (“Streamlining regulatory approvals related 
to leasing and/or joint development of energy projects on tribal lands has also 
become a pressing issue, because most projects involving renewable energy 
resources that are sited on Indian lands usually require approval by the 
Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs, a process that 
necessitates contingent National Environmental Policy Act reviews and 
approvals.”). 
 122. It may be that some tribes are interested in pursuing TERAs.  Royster, 
supra note 112, at 119.  For example, the Sac and Fox Nation may be interested 
in pursuing a TERA in order to aid in the construction of a refinery.  Miles, 
supra note 8, at 475.   However, as of May 7, 2012, no tribe had submitted an 
application to enter into a TERA with the Department of Interior.  See infra 
note 124 and accompanying text; Royster, supra note 112, at 119 (citing 157 
CONG. REC. S6463 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2011) (statement of Sen. Barrasso); 
Discussion Draft of the Indian Energy Promotion and Parity Act of 2010, 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 111th Cong. 10 (2010), at 19-20 
(statement of Hon. Matthew J. Box, Chairman, Southern Ute Indian Tribe) 
(noting that although the tribe was a “vigorous supporter” of ITEDSA, neither it 
nor any other tribe has entered into a TERA because of the difficulties and 
uncertainties involved);  Ryan David Dreveskracht, Economic Development, 
Native Nations, and Solar Projects, 34 J. ENERGY & DEV. 141, 150 (2011); Letter 
from Stephen Manydeeds, Acting Dir., Office of Indian Energy & Econ. Dev., 
Dep’t of Interior, to author (Dec. 1, 2010) (on file with author). 
 123. Letter from Stephen Manydeeds to author, supra note 122. 
 124. E-mail from Catherine Freels, Bureau of Indian Affairs, to author (May 7, 
2012) (on file with author). 
 125. Miles, supra note 8, at 474 (citing Scot W. Anderson, Remarks at the 
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Inst., Special Inst. on Natural Res. Dev. in Indian 
Country: The Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act of 
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legislative history detailed above, it appears that tribes may have 
declined to enter into TERAs because of concerns associated with 
the federally-mandated environmental review program and the 
potential impact of the waiver of federal government liability,126 
which in turn may have implications related to the federal trust 
relationship. 
The waiver of federal liability is itself somewhat of a 
conundrum, as the Secretary is directed to “act in accordance 
with the trust responsibility” and “act in good faith and in the 
best interests of the Indian tribes.”127  The Act provides that 
nothing contained within it “shall absolve the United States from 
any responsibility to Indians or Indian tribes.”128  Yet, at the 
same time, the provisions state that “the United States shall not 
be liable to any party (including any Indian tribe) for any 
negotiated term of, or any loss resulting from the negotiated 
terms” of an agreement entered into under the tribe’s TERA.129  
Although perhaps not directly contradictory, these provisions are 
not entirely consistent with one another, as demonstrated by 
many of the comments highlighted above.  As was explained by 
President Joe Shirley, Jr. of the Navajo Nation, the general 
waiver provisions of TERA are inconsistent with the federal trust 
responsibility and “is an abdication of the federal trust 
responsibility that is patently unfair to tribes.”130 
 
2005:  Opportunities for Cooperative Ventures (Nov. 10, 2005) (transcript on file 
with the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Inst.)). 
 126. The author recognizes that the waiver of federal liability may be only one 
of the reasons tribes have failed to take advantage of the TERA provisions, as 
exemplified by the above discussion.  Another potential reason for the lack of 
tribal participation may be the cumbersome application process.  Unger, supra 
note 15, at 359.  Another reason that tribes have declined to enter into TERAs 
may be because of a lack of adequate funding.  Bethany C. Sullivan, Changing 
Winds: Reconfiguring the Legal Framework for Renewable-Energy Development 
in Indian Country, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 832 (2010).  Finally, tribes may have 
failed to date to take advantage of the TERA provisions because of concerns 
associated with being the first to do so.  However, because the comments 
included in the applicable legislative history seemingly focused on the three 
categories discussed above, those categories are the focus of this article. 
 127. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(A) (2006). 
 128. Id. § 3504(e)(6)(B) 
 129. Id. § 3504(e)(6)(D)(ii). 
 130. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 107 
(statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation). 
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Furthermore, under the existing TERA provisions, tribes are 
increasingly seeing the cost of energy development being shifted 
to themselves.131  This issue dovetails into concerns associated 
with the federally mandated environmental review provision, 
which places additional regulatory burdens on tribes without 
providing financial resources. 
Accordingly, given that the above aspects of the TERA likely 
serve as impediments to tribes entering into TERAs, reform is 
necessary to address these concerns.  In considering potential 
revisions to the TERA provisions, one should keep in mind the 
perspectives of Senators Bingaman and Campbell discussed 
above.  The options for reform may be reflective of the 
perspectives articulated by Senators Bingaman and Campbell, 
one of which represents a vision that encompasses a stronger role 
for the federal government in Indian country and the other which 
represents a vision that encompasses a stronger opportunity for 
tribes to express their sovereignty and self-determination.  Both 
of these options are discussed below. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO SPUR TRIBAL 
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT UNDER TERAS 
Notably, the Obama Administration may be receptive to 
potential options to reform the TERA provisions.  The current 
Administration has generally been open to hearing previous calls 
for reform from Indian country.132  As explained in Section II of 
this paper, America needs to diversify its energy portfolio, and 
Indian country will likely play a role in increased domestic 
production of energy.  However, as President Joe Shirley, Jr. 
explained, tribes are unlikely to “opt in” to the existing TERA 
 
 131. See Royster, supra note 112, at 1099 (explaining that: 
Tribes are concerned that all the costs of energy development are 
being shifted onto them without sufficient resources to meet those 
costs.  Tribes will absorb the costs – both direct and indirect – of 
preparing TERAs, negotiating leases, agreements, and rights-of-way, 
conducting environmental reviews, and responding to challenges by 
“interested parties.”  Grant funds will be available to offset some of 
the costs, and the Department of the Interior is instructed to assist 
with advice and expertise to the extent it can.  But inevitably tribes 
will bear substantial costs.). 
 132. Dreveskracht, supra note 122, at 141-42; LeBeau, supra note 3, at 44. 
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provisions, for the reasons articulated above.133  Even Congress 
seems to recognize the necessity of reform.  In 2009, Senator 
Bryon Dorgan (D-ND), Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs, and Senator John Barrasso (R-WY), Vice 
Chairman of the Committee, released a concept paper on energy 
development and efficiency within Indian country.134  In 
recognizing the need for reform, the concept paper identified 
“outdated laws and cumbersome regulations for tribal energy 
development and programs” as one of the three areas where 
reform was necessary.135  Ultimately, following the release of the 
concept paper and numerous follow-up hearings, legislation was 
proposed to amend the TERA provisions; however, none of this 
legislation was enacted.136  As a result, reform is still very much 
needed.137 
 
 133. Letter from Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation, to Sen. Ben 
Nighthorse Campbell (Apr. 8, 2003); see also Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act 
Hearing, supra note 12, at  110  (statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo 
Nation). 
This waiver could actually undermine the concept of tribal self-
determination by making it clear to non-Indian developers that the 
United States would no longer be held responsible for energy deals 
gone bad. . . . Furthermore, there is no rationale for the federal 
liability waiver if the ultimate responsibility for the final regulatory 
framework controlling the development project still remains with the 
Secretary, as provided for in Section 2605(e).  Such a scheme could 
perpetuate the lose-lose paradigm in which tribes have been trapped 
for too long.  Accordingly, why would any tribe want to “opt in”? 
Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 110 (statement of 
Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation). 
 134. Press Release, United States Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 
Dorgan and Barrasso Release Concept Paper on Indian Energy and Energy 
Efficiency (Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://www.indian.senate.gov/news/ 
pressreleases/2009-09-10.cfm. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Royster, supra note 112, at 120-21, explaining that: 
The Committee held a follow-up hearing in 2009, and from that 
emerged the proposed Indian Energy Parity Act (IEPA) of 2010, 
which contained amendments to the TERA process. The IEPA was 
referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs, which took no action on 
the bill before the end of the session.  In October 2011, Senator 
Barrasso introduced the Indian Tribal Energy Development and 
Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2011. In addition, the 
proposed HEARTH Act, which would amend the surface leasing 
process to include a TERA-like process, was introduced in 2010 and 
referred to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. Although the 
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The discussion below offers two suggestions for reform.  
These options, though somewhat contradictory, would both 
improve upon the existing TERA regulations.  Whether one 
proposal is found more persuasive than the other may turn 
“partly on how one conceptualizes the trust doctrine.  It can be 
seen as a federal duty to protect tribes’ right of self-governance 
and autonomy, or as a way to justify federal power and control 
over tribal affairs.”138  Senators Bingaman’s and Campbell’s 
comments on the then-pending TERA provisions exemplify this 
difference of viewpoint on the federal government’s trust 
responsibility to federally-recognized tribes. 
The first proposal approaches the federal trust responsibility 
from the perspective of promoting tribal sovereignty and self-
determination: the TERA regulations maintain federal decision-
making authority over energy development in Indian country, 
which is unnecessary and perhaps even detrimental to the 
overarching goal of tribal self-determination and energy 
development.  Alternatively, the second proposal for reform 
adopts a “federal” or “paternalistic” perspective of the federal 
trust responsibility: the federal government maintains a 
significant role in energy development in Indian country and 
therefore should be liable for decisions made under TERA 
(presumably to protect the economic stability of tribal 
governments).  In considering these proposals, one must be 
mindful of the fact that the role of the federal government in 
tribal decision-making is a hotly contested issued.139  Moreover, 
these two options for reform are presented in recognition of the 
existing trade-offs between the tribal trust responsibility and full 
tribal sovereignty.  As Professor Ezra Rosser explained, “[t]he 
challenge for Indian scholars and leaders alike is recognizing that 
the future of tribal progress will involve a trade-off between self-
 
Committee approved the bill, the Senate did not act on it before the 
end of session. (citations omitted). 
 137. Scholars and commentators have also called for reform of the TERA 
provisions.  For example, Professor Judith Royster proposes reforms focused on 
the Secretarial approval process.  Royster, supra note 112, at 127-37.  For a 
discussion of the reforms needed to spur energy development in Indian country, 
see generally Sullivan, supra note 126. 
 138. Unger, supra note 15, at 340-41. 
 139. Sullivan, supra note 126, at 831. 
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determination and the trust duties of the federal government.”140  
Interestingly, the Navajo Nation made similar recommendations 
to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs in comments 
submitted in 2003.141 
A. One Potential Avenue for Effective Reform: 
Empower Tribal Governments to Make Decisions 
Regarding Energy Development Without 
Intervention from the Federal Government 
If Congress truly wishes the federal government to be free 
from liability with regard to certain types of energy development 
within Indian country, the TERA provision waiving federal 
government liability may remain.  However, to maximize energy 
development within Indian country and truly promote tribal self-
determination as is the stated goal of the Act, the federal 
government should remove some or all federal “conditions” on 
such development.142  This is consistent with the viewpoint 
expressed by Senator Campbell and discussed above; if tribes are 
to be sovereign, they must have control over regulation within 
their territories and also bear the liability for tribal decision-
making.143  This means that federal mandates, such as the 
 
 140. Ezra Rosser, The Trade-Off Between Self-Determination and the Trust 
Doctrine: Tribal Government and the Possibility of Failure, 58 ARK. L. REV. 291, 
295 (2005).  Notably, it may be the case that the level of acceptable “trade off” 
will differ between individual tribes, as some tribes are in the position to take 
increased responsibility, which may come with the “trade off” of decreased 
federal responsibility. 
 141. Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act Hearing, supra note 12, at 107 
(statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation); see also id. at 120 
(statement of Vernon Hill, Chairman,  E. Shoshone Bus. Council of the Wind 
River Indian Reservation) (“The bills should be amended to provide Indian 
tribes adequate resources to assume these comprehensive federal 
responsibilities.  Providing these resources is consistent with the federal trust 
responsibility and comports with the longstanding policies supporting and 
promoting tribal self-determination and tribal energy self-sufficiency.”). 
 142. This proposal is also somewhat consistent with legislation that has been 
previously proposed, as discussed above.  This is because the previously 
proposed legislation would have modified the existing environmental review 
process.  See Royster, supra note 112, at 125-27. 
 143. This also addresses the concern that decreased interest in energy or 
mineral development under any of the existing applicable statutes in Indian 
country is likely due in part to the fact that Indian tribes cannot generally play 
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mandates listed in the existing TERA provisions related to 
environmental review, should be removed.144  Moreover, under 
the current provisions, “the government’s significant involvement 
in the approval process could be interpreted as an infringement 
on tribal self-sufficiency and sovereignty.”145  As previously 
discussed, many tribes and tribal representatives expressed 
strong concerns about federally-mandated environmental review 
provisions that would potentially disrupt tribal governance and 
subject tribal governments to standards not applicable to the 
states.146  Such reform would empower tribes to become the true 
decision-makers with regard to energy development under the 
TERA provisions.  The proposed reform offers several benefits.  
First, tribes empowered as true decision-makers tend to perform 
better.147  Acting as decision-makers allows tribes to exercise 
their sovereignty, which as discussed above is tied to the overall 
likelihood of tribal economic success.  In order for a tribe to 
exercise its sovereignty as a “true” decision-maker, the federal 
government must play a lesser role in making decisions affecting 
 
an active role in such development.  Id. at 114-15.  By decreasing the role of the 
federal government, the first option for reform therefore increases the likelihood 
that Indian tribes will take an increased role in energy development, which as 
explained herein increases the likelihood of a successful project. 
 144. As previously discussed, some may oppose reform of the TERA provisions 
that would remove the federally-mandated environmental review process.  See 
e.g., Miles, supra note 8, at 472. 
  It is important to note, however, that several tribes have elected to adopt 
NEPA-like Tribal Environmental Policy Acts in order to review tribal actions.  
See Royster, supra note 13, at 1093-94.  Moreover, although this article argues 
for removal of the federally-mandated environmental review process as an 
aspect of this particular reformation of the TERA provisions, the federal 
government through the Secretary of Interior would still have an opportunity to 
review and approve a TERA before it is put in place.  Accordingly, should 
concerns arise regarding a particular tribe’s environmental record, such 
concerns could be aired and addressed during the notice-and-comment process 
associated with approval of the tribe’s TERA application. 
 145. Miles, supra note 8, at 467. 
 146. Id. at 1068-90 (citation omitted); see generally supra Section III.B. 
 147. Royster, supra note 13, at 1068-69 (citation omitted).  Professor Royster 
points out that successful tribal economic development without meaningful 
practical sovereignty (i.e., the ability to act as a sovereign within one’s territory) 
is rare.  Id. at 1069. 
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development within Indian country.148 In fact, scholars have 
deduced that “federal control over economic decision-making is 
‘the core problem in the standard approach to development and a 
primary hindrance to reservation prosperity’.”149 
Tribes that have undertaken increased decision-making roles 
have a demonstrated record of success, as exemplified by tribal 
forest management under Public Law No. 638.  Under P.L. 638, 
tribes may enter into contracts and self-governance compacts to 
assume administration of federal Indian programs, and may use 
the 638 program to gain significant control over natural resources 
development.  For example, a statistical analysis of seventy-five 
forestry tribes showed that in the 1980s, forty-nine of the tribes 
used the 638 program to take some degree of management over 
their forest resources.  The study concluded that “tribal control of 
forestry under P.L. 638 results in significantly better timber 
management.”150  When tribes took complete management over 
their forest resources under 638, output rose as much as forty 
percent with no increase in the number of workers, and the tribes 
received prices as much as six percent higher than they had when 
the forest resources were managed by the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs.151  Empirical proof exists that, at least in the context of 
forest management (which is analogous to energy development 
given both involve the development of natural resources), tribes 
have demonstrated the ability to excel when allowed to exercise 
increased decision-making authority.  As Professor Royster 
concludes, “[t]ribal control of federal programs is thus better than 
federal control, but a clear second-best to tribal choices of what 
programs and development opportunities.”152  By eliminating the 
 
 148. Id. (“Practical sovereignty, no less than political sovereignty, requires 
reducing the role of the federal government.”). 
 149. Id. at 1069 (citing Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Two Approaches to 
Economic Development on American Indian Reservations: One Works, the Other 
Doesn’t 18 (Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs, No. 2005-02, 2006), 
available at http://www.jopna.net/pubs/jopna_2005-02_Approaches.pdf ). 
 150. Id. at 1070 (citations omitted).  
 151. Id.  Professor Royster hypothesizes that the general lack of litigation 
surrounding mineral leases under the Indian Mineral Development Act suggests 
that tribes are doing a good job of managing mineral resources under this Act, 
which gives tribes increased access to practical sovereignty as well.  Id. at 1077. 
 152. Id. at 1070. 
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requirement that tribes entering into a TERA come into 
compliance with a federally-mandated environmental review 
process, tribes would, therefore, have increased decision-making 
authority, which in turn increases practical sovereignty that has 
been shown to increase the likelihood of success of a project. 
Furthermore, reduction of the federal government’s role in 
energy development within Indian country correlates with the 
federal government’s goal to promote tribal self-determination.153  
Although some tribes may not be in a position to take an 
increased role in decision-making within their territories, those 
that are in the position should be encouraged to take an 
increasingly active role, thereby empowering the appropriate 
tribes to be self-determinating.154  The failure of the federal 
government to recognize that many tribes are capable of 
independent decision-making would see tribal nations “frozen in a 
perpetual state of tutelage.”155 
Also, the additional environmental requirements heaped on 
tribes through the TERA provisions are more extensive than 
those required of state governments.  State and local 
governments are not required to comply with NEPA nor with a 
NEPA-like requirement, and therefore placing such a 
requirement on tribal governments would be odd.156  In fact, the 
environmental review requirements placed on tribes under the 
TERA provisions likely go beyond the requirements placed on the 
 
 153. The federal government has arguably had a policy in place to promote 
tribal self-determination since President Nixon first issued a statement to 
Congress addressing tribal self-determination.  See Special Message to Congress 
on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970) (“The time has come to break 
decisively with the past and to create the conditions for a new era in which the 
Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions . . . .”). 
 154. Increased decision-making authority leads to increased tribal economic 
independence and stronger tribal governance.  Unger, supra note 15, at 337. 
 155. Thomas H. Shipps, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: A Step Toward 
Self-Determination, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2007, at 55-56. 
 156. Unger, supra note 15, at 353 (“After the Indian Energy Act was passed, 
one commentator notes that state and local governments are not subject to 
NEPA review requirements and argued that the TERA environmental review 
requirement is ‘more intrusive on the government prerogatives of Indian tribes 
than justified.’”) (citations omitted). 
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federal government.157  The need to subject tribes to a 
requirement more rigorous than that applicable to the federal 
government – and one that is not placed at all on state and local 
governments – is dubious at best. 
Moreover, concerns regarding federal conflicts of interest 
exist within Indian country.  “[A] question arises concerning 
whether the Secretary is acting in the tribe’s interest or the 
United States’ interest when reviewing an EIS and approving or 
disapproving a development lease.”158  For example, in Navajo 
Nation, the Navajo Nation brought suit, alleging that the federal 
government had failed to protect the interests of the Nation in 
part because of conflicting obligations.159  The federal government 
has generally failed to provide adequate oversight to effectively 
manage resource development in Indian country.160 
Some may find this suggested reform – removing the 
mandated environmental review – objectionable, on the basis that 
tribal environmental review would no longer be required should 
the proposed reform be adopted.161  However, the federal 
government would still be required to complete an environmental 
review under NEPA before a tribal TERA may be approved, 
which should allay some concerns.162  Moreover, a TERA would 
 
 157. Id. at 354 (“The Secretary has acknowledged that the TERA 
environmental review provisions go beyond what NEPA requires of the federal 
government.”). 
 158. Miles, supra note 8, at 467. 
 159. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003). 
 160. See Shipps, supra note 154, at 56 (providing that: 
Putting philosophy aside, based on past practices, Congress will 
never commit the resources needed to provide comprehensive, 
timely, and high-quality expertise to tribes as they evaluate and 
undertake mineral development.  The fragmentation of federal 
oversight institutionalized in the discrete functions performed by the 
BIA, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Minerals 
Management Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency 
dilutes consistent and efficient resource management.). 
 161. See supra notes 84 and 85; Miles, supra note 8, at 463-64. 
 162. Miles, supra note 8, at 466. 
The Secretary’s authority, however, to require an EIS under NEPA 
rests on the trustee relationship, not on federal ownership of the 
land, unlike traditional NEPA mandates.  Neither Indians nor 
Indian land is mentioned in the text of NEPA or in its legislative 
history. . . . The courts, however, have held that NEPA applies to 
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only be approved for a period of years, allowing the federal 
government to evaluate the environmental impact of projects 
undertaken by tribes under TERAs after the expiration of the 
approval period.  If, following federal re-review, it is determined 
that the tribe has acted in an environmentally risky manner, the 
federal government may decline to enter into a subsequent TERA 
with the tribe. 
In sum, this proposal for reform would keep the existing 
general waiver of federal liability in the TERA revisions, but 
remove the federal mandates placed on tribes – notably, the 
federally-mandated environmental review and administrative 
provisions.  This proposal is preferable to the existing scheme in 
that it would empower tribes to be true decision-makers as to 
matters affecting their territory.  As seen above, tribes have a 
demonstrated record of success when serving as primary decision-
makers.  Moreover, the proposed reform would promote tribal 
sovereignty and self-determination, which is a stated goal of the 
Act.  For these reasons, the proposed reform represents an 
improvement over the existing TERA provisions. 
B. An Alternative Possibility for Reform: Reinstate 
Federal Liability under the TERA Provisions 
As an alternative, a second recommendation for reforming 
the existing TERA provisions would call for reinstatement of 
federal liability so as to increase tribal participation in TERAs.  
This second proposal is also an improvement over the status quo 
in that it will (with any luck) alleviate tribal concerns related to 
the federal government’s responsibility to tribes.  Such a revision 
would arguably be consistent with the federal government’s trust 
responsibility to tribes.  As “the ability to hold the federal 
government liable for breach is at the heart of its trust obligation 
toward tribes,”163  the waiver of federal governmental liability 
 
leases between Indians and private parties that are subject to 
approval by the federal government. . . . One year after NEPA was 
enacted, Congress clarified that when approving Indian leases, the 
Secretary must consider ‘the effect on the environment for the uses 
to which the leased lands will be subject.’ 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 163. Unger, supra note 15, at 342. 
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seems to be inconsistent with this federal trust obligation.  
Removing the waiver would also allay fears that “private entities 
such as energy companies will exploit tribal resources and take 
unfair advantage of tribes.”164  This is because the federal 
government would likely maintain a more active role in energy 
development under TERAs.  Moreover, this proposal would likely 
be consistent with the federal viewpoint, such as the one 
expressed by Senator Bingaman, which envisions the federal 
government maintaining a significant role in Indian country. 
Congress apparently intended the TERA provisions to be 
consistent with the federal government’s trust responsibility to 
tribes.  For example, one subsection of the TERA provisions refers 
specifically to the federal trust responsibility, affirming that the 
trust responsibility remains in effect.  This provision mandates 
that the Secretary “act in accordance with the trust responsibility 
of the United States relating to mineral and other trust resources 
. . . in good faith and in the best interests of the Indian tribes.”  It 
also notes that with the exception of the waiver of Secretarial 
approval allowed through the TERA framework, the Indian 
Energy Act does not “absolve the United States from any 
responsibility to Indians or Indian tribes, including . . . those 
which derive from the trust relationship.”165 
In addition to apparent consistency with the federal trust 
responsibility, federal liability under the TERA provisions is 
appropriate given that the federal government maintains a 
significant role in the development of energy within Indian 
country even under the TERA agreements.  For example, under 
the TERA provisions, the federal government retains “inherently 
Federal functions.”166  Moreover, as discussed above, the federal 
government maintains a significant oversight role through the 
existing TERA provisions because it has a mandatory 
environmental review process which tribes must incorporate into 
TERAs.  The failure to relinquish oversight to tribes ensures that 
the federal government will maintain a strong management role, 
even after a tribe enters into a TERA with the Secretary of the 
 
 164. Id. at 354. 
 165. Id. at 350 (citations omitted). 
 166. Id. at 356. 
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Interior.  Given that the federal government maintains a 
substantial oversight role under the TERA provisions (which it 
views as consistent with its federal trust responsibility), the 
federal government should remain liable for decisions made 
under TERAs.  In addition to the strong administrative role that 
the federal government would still play under approved TERAs, 
it also maintains an important role as a tribal “reviewer.”  Under 
the TERA provisions, the federal government must review the 
tribe’s performance under the TERA on a regular basis.167  
Although the existing TERA provisions certainly mark an 
increased opportunity for tribes to participate in decision-making 
related to energy development within Indian country, the federal 
government’s role should remain significant.  The proposal to 
reinstate federal liability under the TERA provisions, therefore, 
recognizes the significant role that the federal government still 
plays under the existing TERA provisions. 
If Senator Bingaman’s viewpoint is any indication, Congress 
may be unwilling to relinquish federal oversight over energy 
development within Indian country.  As a result, the first 
proposal for reform discussed above may prove to be unacceptable 
to Congress.  Assuming this is the case, this second proposal 
allows the federal government to maintain an oversight role in 
Indian county and reinstates the federal government’s liability.  
Based on the legislative history detailed above, reinstatement of 
the federal government’s liability would likely address many of 
the concerns raised by tribes regarding the existing TERA 
provisions.  In this way, this second proposal would also 
constitute an improvement over the status quo. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For a variety of reasons, America needs to increase energy 
production from domestic sources.  Indian tribes may prove the 
perfect partners for the federal government to achieve its goal of 
increased domestic production of energy.  These tribes have the 
available natural resources, and experience managing these 
resources, to make them excellent partners.  Increased energy 
 
 167. 25 C.F.R. § 224, subpart F (2012). 
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production within Indian country would serve federal interests 
and tribal interests, as such endeavors would increase tribal 
sovereignty and self-determination while promoting economic 
diversification within Indian country.  Congress recognized this 
potentially beneficial relationship with tribes when it passed the 
TERA provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.  The existing 
TERA provisions arguably “streamline” the process of energy 
production within Indian country.  Under these provisions, tribes 
that enter into a TERA with the Secretary of Interior may be 
relieved of Secretarial oversight in certain regards.  Despite the 
benefits of such “streamlining,” at the time of this writing, no 
tribe has entered into a TERA agreement with the Secretary of 
Interior. 
In an effort to understand the potential reasons for lack of 
tribal engagement with TERA, this article has explored the 
legislative history associated with the TERA provisions.  A review 
of the legislative history has illustrated that concerns related to 
the then-pending TERA provisions generally fell into three 
categories: (1) concerns associated with the federal government’s 
trust responsibility to tribes; (2) concerns associated with 
federally-mandated environmental review provisions; and (3) 
concerns associated with the general waiver of federal liability. 
Based on the review of applicable legislative history and the 
concerns expressed therein, this article proposes reform of the 
TERA provisions.  In particular, this article proposes two 
potential reforms.  The first represents a tribal sovereignty 
perspective.  Under the first proposal, the tribes should be liable 
(i.e., a waiver of federal government liability should be 
maintained) only if tribes are the true decision-makers.  In this 
regard, the first proposal argues for the removal of federal 
mandates, such as the conditions of environmental review and 
administrative oversight.  The reform would allow tribes to truly 
make decisions regarding energy development within their 
territories. 
Because Congress may not accept this proposal, the article 
also proposes an option for reform that maintains the federal 
mandates and oversight role of the federal government, but 
reinstates the federal government’s liability under the TERA 
provisions.  Such a reinstitution of federal liability is consistent 
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with the federal government’s trust responsibility to tribes.  
Although the two proposals are contradictory, both represent 
improvements over the status quo and, should either be adopted 
by Congress, would encourage tribes to enter into TERAs with 
the Secretary of Interior. 
The historical relationship between the federal government 
and tribes is replete with examples of abuse and exploitation.  
The TERA provisions represent a rare opportunity for both the 
federal government and tribes to benefit from one another.  Yet, 
the TERA provisions in their current configuration fail to induce 
such a partnership.  By adopting one of the proposed reforms, 
Congress would take a significant step toward building a 
productive relationship with Indian tribes. 
49
